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Abstract: The main aim of prudential regulations is to increase the stability of financial 
systems; however, such regulations also increase the risk-taking tendency of banks, 
they encourage them to combine and limit their lending possibilities with, at the same 
time, lowering the efficiency of monetary policy in affecting economic processes. Thus, 
it occurs as a reasonable solution to integrate macroprudential supervision with mo-
netary policy of the central bank and to subsequently limit the pro-cycle character of 
these regulations. 
The aim of this article is to discuss the importance of the regulatory channel in the 
process of transmitting impulses of monetary policy into economy and to overview the 
results of research, which analyzed the influence of macroprudential regulations on 
bank lending policy as well as their sensitivity towards monetary policy of the central 
bank. 
Translated by Magdalena Redo
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 Introduction
The mechanism of transmitting impulses of monetary policy can be described 
as activities of economic entities resulting from the policy of the central bank 
(Kokoszczyński 1999, 8). 
The central bank, with help of its instruments, has a possibility of influ-
encing the course of economic processes for realizing its basic aim – ensuring 
stability of prices and, thanks to that, stability of production. Due to the com-
plexity and changeability of economic processes, reaction of economic entities 
towards changes in interest rates of the central bank is conducted in different 
ways (by transmission channels). Traditional channels of transmission include 
an interest rate channel, credit channel and an exchange rate channel (Dem-
chuk, Łyziak, Przystupa, Sznajderska, Wróbel 2011). However, the on-going 
economic development, processes of internationalization, globalization, devel-
opment of finance markets, and more detailed research of mechanism of trans-
mission led to pointing to other important ways (channels) in which monetary 
policy of the central bank influences economy (production and level of prices) 
and they visualize complexity of traditional channels as well as numerous links 
between those. 
The following scheme presents a synthetic approach to transmission chan-
nels of monetary policy, with which central banks influence activities of eco-
nomic entities, the scope of production and levels of prices. It allows for an 
overall view on contemporary knowledge about complexity of processes of 
transmitting impulses of monetary policy into economy and highlights, aside 
from the traditional channel of interest rates, credit channels and channels of 
assets prices. It also highlights the importance of the influence of monetary 
policy on the scope of lending and on the price of marketable assets for eco-
nomic processes, and also on the effectiveness of transmission mechanisms 
(scheme 1; Redo 2013). 
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Source: self-reported data on the basis of Mishkin, 2007, Boivin, Kiley, Mishkin, 2010, Mishkin, 2001 and 
Bank of England, 2014. 
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The article is a critical analysis of literature, reports and the results of econometric stud-
ies concerning the impact of prudential regulation on banks’ functioning and the process of 
transmitting monetary policy into the economy. There have been used induction method 
and comparison method. 
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S o u r c e : self-reported data on the basis of Mishkin, 2007, Boivin, Kiley, Mishkin, 2010, Mishkin, 
2001 and Bank of England, 2014.
The research methodology and the course of the research process
The article is a critical analysis of literature, reports and the results of econo-
metric studies concerning the impact of prudential regulation on banks’ func-
tioning and the process of transmitting monetary policy into the economy. 
There have be n used induction meth d and comparison method.
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Regulatory channel in the process  
of transmitting monetary policy1
Due to the lack of general agreement regarding expansion of monetary policy’s 
aims and making it responsible for preventing financial instabilities, mainly 
providing more restrictive monetary policy (leaning against the wind) which 
would prevent excessive loan actions, especially in the face of high increase 
of prices on the assets’ markets of entities which are the most susceptible to-
wards speculative bubble, macroprudential regulations became the main tool 
for preventing the aforementioned. Regulations for financial institutions, for 
instance capital requirements of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and European Banking Supervision (introducing financial leverage ratio, short-
term liquidity norm, redefining classes of liquid assets) or the level of the re-
serve requirement and its interest rate (importance of which has become mar-
ginalized, especially in the Western countries, due to popularity of the Basel 
regulations in the 90’s of the 20th century) greatly influence the scope of the 
bank capital channel, their risk-taking channel and the bank lending channel- 
thus, they influence functioning of the mechanism of transmitting monetary 
policy into economy and its efficiency. 
Capital regulations cause the increase of costs in functioning of banks due 
to the necessity of meeting them (the fear of exceeding limits forces them to 
undertake costly preventing actions) and they greatly influence the way of ob-
serving, managing and evaluating risk by these banks (and so they influence the 
tendency to risk-taking and functioning) – Borio, Zhu 2008. They also greatly 
limit the possibilities of issuing loans by banks, which is proved by the results 
of empirical studies. They also cause lowering of banks’ profits and the amount 
of their capital; encouraging banks to connect may cause higher concentration 
of the banking sector (Chami, Cosimano 2001). As Bernanke, Low (1991) indi-
cated, Regulations of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision from 1988 
(Basel I) contributed to a significant limitation of supply of loans in the reces-
sion period of 1990–91 in the USA (credit crunch), much greater than in the case 
of banks not subject to these regulations (Peek, Rosengren 1993). The relation 
1 It played an essential role in the USA in the process of transmitting monetary pol-
icy by influencing the supply of loans in the beginning of the 80’s of the 20th century 
when government regulations and Regulation Q were significantly shaping the market 
of mortgage loans (McCarthy, Peach 2002; Brayton, Mauskopf 1985).
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between issuing the aforementioned capital regulations and the lowering of 
the loans’ supply in the United States was also confirmed by, for instance, Peek, 
Rosengren (1992) and Hancock, Wilcox (1992) or Wagster (1999); Breeden, Is-
sac (1992) even advocated abolishing Basel I regulations by accusing them of 
crashing the loans’ action in the United States in 90’s of the 20th century. Berg-
er, Udel (1994) also added that capital regulations of Basel I may be partial-
ly responsible for the decrease in the supply of loans. Wagster (1999) indicat-
ed also one economically significant effect – strong relocation of the capital 
from loans to government bonds in banks not only within the United States but 
also in Canada and Great Britain (due to the Basel I regulation, loans required 
8% of capital safety, and treasury bonds only the maximum level of 1.6%). It 
was confirmed by Furfine (2001), who pointed out a significant decrease of the 
share of commercial loans within the banks’ wallets in the contrast to treas-
ury bonds. Borio, Zhu (2008) also pointed that prudential regulations strength-
ened the activity of the risk-taking channel and also that the influence of capi-
tal and supervisory regulations on the financial system and the course of the 
business cycle increased. Peek, Rosengren (1997) indicated that the commer-
cial sector of real estate is very sensitive towards capital regulations of banks; 
Hancock, Wilcox (1997) showed that crediting of commercial real estates in 
the USA is much more sensitive towards the capital shock of banks than cred-
iting for housing (which is, partially, an effect of the political support of devel-
oping house-building). As Boivin, Kiley, Mishkin (2010) show, the past decades 
brought a number of regulatory changes, especially with respect to mortgage 
loans which made them more coupled with the interest rate and less coupled 
with creditworthiness. 
Watanabe (2007) indicated that the Basel I regulations in terms of capital 
adequacy issued in Japan from March 1993 also contributed in the following 
years to a great decrease in the loans’ supply. Peek, Rosengren (1997) point-
ed that these regulations contributed also to a great decrease in the loans’ 
supply for the Japanese banks in the USA (harsher capital requirements were 
used in this case); these banks, in the culmination moment in the 90’s of the 
20th century were creditors of 18% of manufacture and trade loans in the USA 
(in 1988 all of the 10 biggest banks around the world had their headquarters 
in Japan). These conclusions were confirmed by Ito, Nagataki Sasaki (1998), 
who indicated that capital regulations greatly influenced the lowering of cred-
it actions of active banks on foreign markets, which were subject to harsher 
limitations. Economic Planning Agency (1998) indicated that the tendency to 
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issuing loans in Japan is more sensitive towards capital regulations than reg-
ulations on the quality of assets. Limiting the supply of loans on the basis of 
issuing capital regulations of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision is 
observed also in developing economies. Choi (2000) confirmed that issuing 
regulations regarding capital adequacy in the 90’s of the 20th century in Ko-
rean banks caused the decrease of tendency for issuing loans. Chiuri, Ferri, 
Majnoni (2001) documented decrease in the supply of loans by analyzing 16 
rising economies which implemented Basel I regulations in the 90’s in the 20th 
century. They also showed that the phenomenon was much stronger in banks 
with lower capitalization. Jackson et al (1999) pointed that regulations caused 
the increase in capital adequacy ratio, especially among banks with lower cap-
italization, and the improvement takes part due to financial activities which 
are more attractive for the bank at the given time – in the period of good busi-
ness cycle it is more likely to happen due to the increase in the bank’s own cap-
ital (because of higher risk and cheaper emission of shares), and at the time of 
crisis through limiting credit actions. Tanaka (2002) points that capital regu-
lations are a crucial determining factor when it comes to sensitivity of the sup-
ply of loans on interest rates; thus, Basel II regulations may lead to a higher 
decrease of the loans’ supply in the situation of higher credit risk ; they may 
also limit the efficiency of monetary policy as a tool for stimulating economic 
growth in the time of recession. 
Although reserve requirement nowadays has a small role in stabilizing the 
financial sector also in many developing economies (but not in all, for example 
in China it is about 20% and is actively used to fight inflation), it has occurred 
due to the current financial crisis that it is a powerful tool of the influence that 
monetary policy of the central bank has on the financial situation of banks and 
the loans supply. It is confirmed by Montoro, Moreno (2011), who pointed nega-
tive relationship between the changes in the level of reserve requirements (in-
crease and decrease during the crisis of 2007) in Brazil, Colombia and Peru, 
and the loans supply. Mesquita, Toros (2010) pointed also that the aforemen-
tioned reduction of reserve requirement in Brazil contributed to re-establish-
ing financing small financial institutions which were hurt the most due to the 
decrease of country’s liquidity. Herrera, Betancourt, Varela, Rodriguez (2919) 
showed that the changes regarding the level of reserve requirement contrib-
uted to strengthening of the actions of the direct channel of interest rates in 
Colombia; they also pointed that lowering the reserve requirement generates 
a stronger reaction of the market’s interest rates than its increase. 
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Regulation directions
Maddaloni, Peydró (2010) underline that the existing financial crisis forces new 
duties on central banks – the necessity of conducting macroprudential supervi-
sion to monitor system risk. Before the crisis, Rajan (2005) had indicated the 
crucial increase of the risk tendency in the financial world and he also pointed 
to the increase of danger for economies due to disturbances in the functioning 
of financial sector in the future; he suggested that it should be reflected in mon-
etary policy and supervisory activities which should limit tendency to risk-tak-
ing in financial institutions. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, Vig (2008) also underlined 
the necessity of improving functioning of mechanisms of testing creditworthi-
ness and better clarity with respect to securitization. They also suggested dif-
ferentiating between securitization for assets with poorer and richer sources 
of information (as an effect of the more thorough evaluation of credibility). Pur-
nanandam (2009) pointed that bigger problems in the situation of a shock have 
banks with low capitalization and lower share of deposits on demand, pointing 
at the same time to the direction of developing regulations for financial risk and 
capital ratio of banks. Also Farhi, Tirole (2009) underline the importance of the 
macroprudential supervision and suggest that optimum regulations should be 
in the form of minimum liquidity requirements combined with monitoring of 
the quality of liquid bank assets. Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Suarez (2013) point that, 
in order to acquire stability of prices and financial stability, it is essential to 
integrate macroprudential regulations with monetary policy. Although tight-
ening of the monetary policy in the connection with good business cycle may 
contribute to the realization of both aims (it will decrease the inflation pres-
sure and the tendency to risk-taking), in the situation similar to the one before 
the crisis of 2007/08 with low inflation and exceeding tendency to risk-taking, 
tightening of the monetary policy would limit risk-taking, but it would cause an 
undesired decrease in economic activity and/or cause deflation. That is why, 
in such case, it is necessary to use regulatory tools in close coordination with 
monetary policy of the central bank, which serves as a strong argument for the 
centralization of the macroprudential supervising by the monetary power. 
Character of regulations
The latest research (for example Geneva Report on World Economy 2009) indi-
cate that regulations must be counter-cyclical, meaning they should be harsher 
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in the times of good business cycle, and looser in the period of economic stagna-
tion. However, Rajan (2009) points that capital regulations contributed, in the 
period of good business cycle before the crisis of 2007, to transferring bank ac-
tivity towards unregulated financial mediation (what, paradoxically, deepened 
the crisis), and not to creating better stability. Thus, he indicates that it is cru-
cial to focus on creating regulations, which sustain fluctuations of business cy-
cle, instead of arguing about too high or too low level of regulating activities of 
financial institutions. Aliaga-Díaz, Olivero, Powell (2011) pointed that counter-
cyclical regulations of Basel III from 2010 (implying the improve of the quality 
of assets and capital buffer) did not bring any spectacular advantages because 
banks had already kept the higher level of required capital ratio (capital buff-
er – exceeding requirements of Basel III) in case of future shocks. Additional-
ly, banks accurately anticipate the possibility of lowering the capital buffer in 
the period of worse business cycle; thus, they reduce counter-cyclical regula-
tory activities. For example, in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia they indicated that 
these economies were hurt due to the last financial crisis on much lower level 
due to high capital buffers kept on the level significantly exceeding regulatory 
requirements (it could be said that a number of past crises has become a les-
son learned for financial institutions) proving at the same time, that, although 
counter-cyclical regulations of Basel III contributed to limiting consumption 
fluctuation, they increased investment fluctuation (because of too fast limiting 
of the capital buffer). Also Zicchino (2005) pointed to the pro-cyclical activity 
of capital regulations. It must be noted, however, that the monetary power also 
has the possibility of mitigating the pro-cyclical influence of macropruden-
tial regulations. Cecchetti, Li (2005) indicate that Blum, Hellwig (1995) were 
the first to show that capital regulations may tighten fluctuations of the busi-
ness cycle; however, their analyses do not include the possibility of mitigating 
the effects by the monetary policy. That is why, it is suggested that monetary 
policy should react more strongly in the situation of shrinking of banks capi-
tals, which will weaken the pro-cyclical influence of prudential regulations and 
maybe even neutralize the influence. It was also indicated by them that FED 
in the 90’s of the 20th century led the monetary policy according to the afore-
mentioned theory and lowered interest rates more significantly in the situa-
tion of bank shock; at the same time, it weakened the pro-cyclical character of 
bank regulations introduced in the 80’s, contrastively to the policies of central 
banks in Germany or Japan in the 80’s. (Cecchetti, Li 2005). This serves as an-
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other important argument for coordinating the macroprudential supervision 
with monetary policy. 
Regulations in developing countries
It needs to be pointed out that the majority of research is conducted in devel-
oped economies- their financial system is significantly different from the one 
in developing countries. That is why, it is essentially important to devote more 
attention to development and modification of tools for modeling mechanisms of 
transmitting monetary policy in developing countries, which will take into con-
sideration its specificity (Agénor, Pereira da Silva 2011). Agénor, Alper, Pereira 
da Silva (2012) pointed that, in the case of developing countries, it is a much 
better solution to provide regulations limiting the increase of credit actions 
and excessive risk, than to tighten monetary policy in the situation of infla-
tion pressure because of high risk of the flow of capital from abroad which may 
cause the credit boom, the increase in the prices of assets and the strengthen-
ing of the currency and, at the same time, worsen attractiveness of the economy 
and worsen the deficit on the current account. Increasing flow of growing cap-
ital around the world, extending stagnation in Western economies, low inter-
est rates (and profitability of investments relying on such), as well as quantita-
tive loosening conducted by the biggest central banks cause an increased flow 
of capital to some economies (the so-called sudden floods). The flood of capital, 
which came to the countries of Latin America within the years of 2009–2011, 
caused the credit boom and fear of the bubble’s crack due to fragile financial 
and economic stability of the region. 
However, the problem is also found in highly-developed economies. Within 
the last years, also small-developed economies such as Switzerland, Sweden or 
Australia, which issue exchange reserves that, are alternative for dollar or euro 
became beneficiaries of huge flow of capital. Thus, the aforementioned may (or 
even should) significantly strengthen the importance of regulatory channel 
in these countries at a cost of a direct channel of interest rate (Agénor, Alper, 
Pereira da Silva 2012). There is a need to show the other side of the coin. In the 
case of developing economies, where banks are the only financial middlemen, 
the regulations’ effect may be totally different from the one that is expected. As 
Chiuri, Ferri, Majnoni (2001) point out, capital regulations, instead of creating 
advantages due to reducing bad credits, may lead to decrease in banks fluidity 
and to decrease in economic activity.
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 Conclusions
Prudential regulations, which are to increase the stability of financial systems 
and economies, increase also the risk-taking tendency of banks and encourage 
them to search for higher profits on dynamically developing financial markets 
and the resign from crediting common economic entities – the realistic econo-
my. These regulations lead banks also to combining and creating huge capital 
groups, with at the same time limiting efficiency of functioning of the banking 
sector and the entire financial sector, including economies. They also limit pos-
sibilities of banks to give credits, so the entire credit action itself is limited and 
the possibilities of development of the entire economy are limited – it may be 
especially noticed in economies where the banking sector is a dominant one. 
The level of capital in banks is one of the major factors determining sensibil-
ity of credit supply towards interest rates. Thus, all regulations in this area 
limit efficiency of monetary policy as a tool for stimulating economic growth. 
It does not mean, however, that it is necessary to resign from them. A just so-
lution would be to integrate macroprudential regulations with monetary poli-
cy. Although restrictive monetary policy in the times of good business cycle is 
able to weaken the risk-taking tendency and inflation pressure, in the situation 
when exceeding risk-taking tendency is accompanied with low inflation (for 
example before the crisis of 2008), tightening of monetary policy could lead do 
deflation (and unwelcomed decrease of the economic growth). Thus, it serves 
as a strong argument for coordinating regulation tools with monetary policy. 
As Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Suarez (2013) show, it is also a strong argument for cen-
tralization of the macroprudential supervision within the scope of monetary 
power. Additional argument for would be the pro-cyclical effect of regulation, 
which monetary policy may try to decrease or even neutralize through strong-
er reaction of central banks in the situation of bank shocks. 
Development of the regulations themselves is necessary. From the point of 
efficiency of monetary policy’s actions towards economy, apart from limiting 
their pro-cyclical character, studies also show the necessity of stronger quality 
control, control of flow of assets, more clarity in securitization process as well 
as weakening the risk-taking tendency of financial institutions which is, para-
doxically, increased by regulations (more at Redo 2013). It also must be indicat-
ed that the majority of research analyzing the effects of prudential regulations 
are conducted in highly-developed economies – their financial systems signifi-
cantly differ from the ones in developing countries. That is why it is necessary 
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to explore the effects of implemented and developed regulations in less-devel-
oped economies – also in Poland, where banks are also very often lower capital-
ized and, as the results of the studies show, the credit supply is more sensible 
towards regulations what may significantly affect possibilities of development 
or surviving crises. 
This issue is additionally worsened by the increasing consolidation of the 
banking sector on the international scale, which allows for easier movement 
of the capital – as an effect, weaker economies will be subject to a more in-
tense phenomenon of credit crunch and a problem with efficiency of transmit-
ting monetary policy, which aims at increasing the economy. Thus, it would be 
advisable to think about modifying such regulation, which would enable for 
protecting weaker economies, which, in situations of crisis, are unfortunately 
susceptible towards outflow of capital and escalation of the aforementioned 
phenomena. 
Prudential regulations and supervisory activities are affecting more and 
more the financial system and the functioning of economy. It partially corre-
sponds to the changes in perceiving and evaluating risk and the higher sensi-
tivity towards capital requirements. Carney (2009) indicated that it is advisa-
ble to keep in mind that implementing prudential regulations will influence the 
mechanism of transmitting monetary policy and thus it will change identified 
effects of using instruments of monetary policy. 
It appears that now it is too late, but when the next crisis appears (it will 
appear, sooner or later), a moment of shock must be used to make politicians 
from main financial centres to think about the world’s future and to implement 
a broader spectrum and/or more radical limitations for financial institutions 
(which currently use hundreds of billions of USD). If not, it would be advisable 
to, at least, implement proper taxation on such institutions and use such means 
as a source of credits for small and medium businesses which would become 
a great advantage for 7 billion of people who, from the 80’s and 90’s of the 20th 
century, have been victims and not important background for a small group 
of the world’s financiers. Such solution would enable not only for limiting the 
speed of growth of global imbalances and the scale of future crises, for support-
ing the world’s economic development and mitigation of crises phenomena, but 
also for increasing the efficiency of monetary policy. 
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